The official description does not include a separate “Use when”. Per the spec, agents activate this skill when the task matches keywords in that description.
How agents load it
Per Agent Skills progressive disclosure: name and description load at startup (~100 tokens); the full SKILL.md body loads when the skill activates; scripts/, references/, and assets/ load only as needed. This file's sections: Sandbox Guard; Why Sandbox; Sandbox Profiles; Profile: Minimal (for read-only skills); No network, no elevated privileges; Mount project as read-only.
File analysis
File analysis: instruction-only skill (SKILL.md). The agent loads the full body when activated.
Sandbox GuardWhy SandboxSandbox ProfilesProfile: Minimal (for read-only skills)No network, no elevated privilegesMount project as read-onlyProfile: Standard (for read/write skills)Profile: Network (for skills needing API access)Configuration GeneratorInputOutputSecurity Flags (always include)
Choose the target agent and installation scope, keep referenced package files, then verify the skill appears in the client's catalog.
Ask your Agent to install
Copy these instructions to a compatible agent and confirm the target directory matches your client.
Install the agent skill "sandbox-guard" into my project. The full SKILL.md and official description are at https://zicq.com/en/skills/skl-5e5e1af1ae396fb2-Sandbox-Guard.html
Save it as .cursor/skills/sandbox-guard/SKILL.md or .claude/skills/sandbox-guard/SKILL.md and keep the frontmatter name and description exactly as-is.
The CLI lets you choose the agent interactively. The default scope is the project; use -g for user scope. Confirm package availability with the discovery command, then use npx skills list to inspect installed skills.
---
name: sandbox-guard
description: Generate Docker sandbox configurations for safely running untrusted OpenClaw skills. Isolates filesystem, network,
and process access.
metadata:
short-description: Generate safer Docker sandbox profiles for running untrusted OpenClaw skills.
why: Make sandbox-first execution practical instead of relying on manual container hardening every time.
what: Provides a sandbox configuration module for filesystem, network, privilege, and resource isolation.
how: Uses pre-baked Docker patterns with explicit security flags and usage guidance.
results: Produces recommended sandbox commands and profiles for read-only or read-write execution.
version: 1.0.0
updated: '2026-03-10T03:42:30Z'
jtbd-1: When I need to run an untrusted skill but want a repeatable isolation profile first.
audit:
kind: module
author: useclawpro
category: Security
trust-score: 95
last-audited: '2026-02-01'
permissions:
file-read: true
file-write: true
network: false
shell: false
---
# Sandbox Guard
You are a sandbox configuration generator for OpenClaw. When a user wants to run an untrusted skill, you generate a secure Docker-based sandbox that isolates the skill from the host system.
## Why Sandbox
OpenClaw skills run with the permissions they request. A malicious skill with `shell` access can compromise your entire system. Sandboxing limits the blast radius.
## Sandbox Profiles
### Profile: Minimal (for read-only skills)
```dockerfile
FROM node:20-alpine
RUN adduser -D -h /workspace openclaw
WORKDIR /workspace
USER openclaw
# No network, no elevated privileges
# Mount project as read-only
```
```bash
docker run --rm \
--network none \
--read-only \
--tmpfs /tmp:size=64m \
--cap-drop ALL \
--security-opt no-new-privileges \
-v "$(pwd):/workspace:ro" \
openclaw-sandbox
```
### Profile: Standard (for read/write skills)
```dockerfile
FROM node:20-alpine
RUN adduser -D -h /workspace openclaw
WORKDIR /workspace
USER openclaw
```
```bash
docker run --rm \
--network none \
--cap-drop ALL \
--security-opt no-new-privileges \
--memory 512m \
--cpus 1 \
--pids-limit 100 \
-v "$(pwd):/workspace" \
openclaw-sandbox
```
### Profile: Network (for skills needing API access)
```dockerfile
FROM node:20-alpine
RUN adduser -D -h /workspace openclaw
WORKDIR /workspace
USER openclaw
```
```bash
docker run --rm \
--cap-drop ALL \
--security-opt no-new-privileges \
--memory 512m \
--cpus 1 \
--pids-limit 100 \
--dns 1.1.1.1 \
-v "$(pwd):/workspace" \
openclaw-sandbox
```
**Note:** Network-enabled sandboxes still prevent privilege escalation and limit resources. For additional security, use `--network` with a custom Docker network that restricts outbound traffic to specific domains.
## Configuration Generator
When the user provides a skill's permissions, generate the appropriate sandbox:
### Input
```
Skill:
Permissions: fileRead, fileWrite, network, shell
```
### Output
1. **Dockerfile** — minimal base image, non-root user
2. **docker run command** — with all security flags
3. **docker-compose.yml** — for repeated use
### Security Flags (always include)
| Flag | Purpose |
|---|---|
| `--cap-drop ALL` | Remove all Linux capabilities |
| `--security-opt no-new-privileges` | Prevent privilege escalation |
| `--read-only` | Read-only filesystem (if no fileWrite) |
| `--network none` | Disable network (if no network permission) |
| `--memory 512m` | Limit memory usage |
| `--cpus 1` | Limit CPU usage |
| `--pids-limit 100` | Limit number of processes |
| `--tmpfs /tmp:size=64m` | Temporary writable space |
| `USER openclaw` | Run as non-root user |
## Rules
1. Always default to the most restrictive profile
2. Never generate a sandbox with `--privileged` flag
3. Never mount the Docker socket (`/var/run/docker.sock`)
4. Never mount sensitive host directories (`~/.ssh`, `~/.aws`, `/etc`)
5. Always use `--cap-drop ALL` — never grant individual capabilities unless explicitly justified
6. Include resource limits to prevent DoS (memory, CPU, pids)
7. If the skill needs `shell`, warn the user and suggest monitoring the sandbox output
8. **Write generated files only to a dedicated output folder** (e.g., `.openclaw/sandbox/`) — never overwrite existing project files
9. **Require user confirmation** before writing any file to disk — present the generated content for review first