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技能库 智客分类:安全测试 django-access-review

Django Access Review

Django 出入控制和IDOR安全审查。 在审查 Django 视图、 DRF 视图、 ORM 查询或任何处理用户授权的 Python/ Django 代码时使用 。 触发关键词:"IDOR","访问控制","授权","Django权限","对象权限","租户隔离","中断访问".

1747 安装量

官方网址:skills.sh

技能介绍

先看中文介绍;官方 description 原文单独保留,不改写 SKILL.md。

做什么

Django出入控制和IDOR安全审查

何时用

查看 Django 视图、 DRF 视图、 ORM 查询或任何处理用户授权的 Python/ Django 代码。 触发关键词:"IDOR","访问控制","授权","Django权限","对象权限","租户隔离","中断访问"

代理如何加载

按 Agent Skills 渐进披露:启动时只加载 name 与 description(约 100 token);任务匹配后才读入整份 SKILL.md 正文;scripts/、references/、assets/ 仅在需要时再读。 本文件正文结构:Django Access Control & IDOR Review、Philosophy: Investigation Over Pattern Matching、Phase 1: Understand the Authorization Model、How is authorization enforced?、Investigation commands、Find how auth is typically done。

文件分析

文件分析:这是一份仅含 SKILL.md 的指令型技能,代理激活后整份正文进入上下文。

官方 description(原文)

Django access control and IDOR security review. Use when reviewing Django views, DRF viewsets, ORM queries, or any Python/Django code handling user authorization. Trigger keywords: "IDOR", "access control", "authorization", "Django permissions", "object permissions", "tenant isolation", "broken access".

Django Access Control & IDOR ReviewPhilosophy: Investigation Over Pattern MatchingPhase 1: Understand the Authorization ModelHow is authorization enforced?Investigation commandsFind how auth is typically doneFind base classes that views inherit fromFind custom managersFind ownership fields on modelsPhase 2: Map the Attack SurfaceWhat resources exist?What operations are exposed?

· 许可:LICENSE · allowed-tools:Read, Grep, Glob, Bash, Task

来源分类:skills.sh agent-skill

SKILL.md 与 Agent 调用

官方规范 ↗
name
django-access-review
description
Django access control and IDOR security review. Use when reviewing Django views, DRF viewsets, ORM queries, or any Python/Django code handling user authorization. Trigger keywords: "IDOR", "access control", "authorization", "Django permissions", "object permissions", "tenant isolation", "broken access".
allowed-tools
Read, Grep, Glob, Bash, Task实验字段,支持情况取决于客户端;字段声明本身不会授予工具权限。
许可
LICENSE
  1. 发现技能客户端向 Agent 提供名称与描述目录。
  2. 匹配与调用用户指定或任务匹配后,载入 SKILL.md 指令。
  3. 按需加载按步骤读取参考文档、使用脚本与素材。

具体调用语法与可用工具以目标 Agent 客户端为准。 查看调用机制说明 ↗

安装这个技能

Skills CLI ↗

先选择目标 Agent 和安装范围,保留技能包的附属文件,安装后检查客户端能否发现该技能。

交给 Agent 安装

复制安装指令给支持 Agent Skills 的代理,确认其中的目标目录与客户端匹配。

把 Agent Skill「django-access-review」安装到我的项目:SKILL.md 原文与官方 description 见 https://zicq.com/zh/skills/skl-1c13e222aa63ca4c-Django-%E8%AE%BF%E9%97%AE%E5%AE%A1%E6%9F%A5.html
请存为 .cursor/skills/django-access-review/SKILL.md 或 .claude/skills/django-access-review/SKILL.md,frontmatter 的 name 与 description 保持原样,不要改写。

GitHub 完整包 ↗

终端安装 · Skills CLI

需要 Node.js 与 npx。先查看仓库技能列表,确认实际名称。

npx skills add 'https://github.com/getsentry/skills' --list

npx skills add 'https://github.com/getsentry/skills' --skill 'django-access-review'

CLI 会交互选择目标 Agent,默认安装到项目;用户级安装使用 -g。先通过查看命令核对仓库内容,再用 npx skills list 检查已安装技能。

阅读排版
--- name: django-access-review description: 'Django access control and IDOR security review. Use when reviewing Django views, DRF viewsets, ORM queries, or any Python/Django code handling user authorization. Trigger keywords: "IDOR", "access control", "authorization", "Django permissions", "object permissions", "tenant isolation", "broken access".' allowed-tools: Read, Grep, Glob, Bash, Task license: LICENSE --- # Django Access Control & IDOR Review Find access control vulnerabilities by investigating how the codebase answers one question: **Can User A access, modify, or delete User B's data?** ## Philosophy: Investigation Over Pattern Matching Do NOT scan for predefined vulnerable patterns. Instead: 1. **Understand** how authorization works in THIS codebase 2. **Ask questions** about specific data flows 3. **Trace code** to find where (or if) access checks happen 4. **Report** only what you've confirmed through investigation Every codebase implements authorization differently. Your job is to understand this specific implementation, then find gaps. --- ## Phase 1: Understand the Authorization Model Before looking for bugs, answer these questions about the codebase: ### How is authorization enforced? Research the codebase to find: ``` □ Where are permission checks implemented? - Decorators? (@login_required, @permission_required, custom?) - Middleware? (TenantMiddleware, AuthorizationMiddleware?) - Base classes? (BaseAPIView, TenantScopedViewSet?) - Permission classes? (DRF permission_classes?) - Custom mixins? (OwnershipMixin, TenantMixin?) □ How are queries scoped? - Custom managers? (TenantManager, UserScopedManager?) - get_queryset() overrides? - Middleware that sets query context? □ What's the ownership model? - Single user ownership? (document.owner_id) - Organization/tenant ownership? (document.organization_id) - Hierarchical? (org -> team -> user -> resource) - Role-based within context? (org admin vs member) ``` ### Investigation commands ```bash # Find how auth is typically done grep -rn "permission_classes\|@login_required\|@permission_required" --include="*.py" | head -20 # Find base classes that views inherit from grep -rn "class Base.*View\|class.*Mixin.*:" --include="*.py" | head -20 # Find custom managers grep -rn "class.*Manager\|def get_queryset" --include="*.py" | head -20 # Find ownership fields on models grep -rn "owner\|user_id\|organization\|tenant" --include="models.py" | head -30 ``` **Do not proceed until you understand the authorization model.** --- ## Phase 2: Map the Attack Surface Identify endpoints that handle user-specific data: ### What resources exist? ``` □ What models contain user data? □ Which have ownership fields (owner_id, user_id, organization_id)? □ Which are accessed via ID in URLs or request bodies? ``` ### What operations are exposed? For each resource, map: - List endpoints - what data is returned? - Detail/retrieve endpoints - how is the object fetched? - Create endpoints - who sets the owner? - Update endpoints - can users modify others' data? - Delete endpoints - can users delete others' data? - Custom actions - what do they access? --- ## Phase 3: Ask Questions and Investigate For each endpoint that handles user data, ask: ### The Core Question **"If I'm User A and I know the ID of User B's resource, can I access it?"** Trace the code to answer this: ``` 1. Where does the resource ID enter the system? - URL path: /api/documents/{id}/ - Query param: ?document_id=123 - Request body: {"document_id": 123} 2. Where is that ID used to fetch data? - Find the ORM query or database call 3. Between (1) and (2), what checks exist? - Is the query scoped to current user? - Is there an explicit ownership check? - Is there a permission check on the object? - Does a base class or mixin enforce access? 4. If you can't find a check, is there one you missed? - Check parent classes - Check middleware - Check managers - Check decorators at URL level ``` ### Follow-Up Questions ``` □ For list endpoints: Does the query filter to user's data, or return everything? □ For create endpoints: Who sets the owner - the server or the request? □ For bulk operations: Are they scoped to user's data? □ For related resources: If I can access a document, can I access its comments? What if the document belongs to someone else? □ For tenant/org resources: Can User in Org A access Org B's data by changing the org_id in the URL? ``` --- ## Phase 4: Trace Specific Flows Pick a concrete endpoint and trace it completely. ### Example Investigation ``` Endpoint: GET /api/documents/{pk}/ 1. Find the view handling this URL → DocumentViewSet.retrieve() in api/views.py 2. Check what DocumentViewSet inherits from → class DocumentViewSet(viewsets.ModelViewSet) → No custom base class with authorization 3. Check permission_classes → permission_classes = [IsAuthenticated] → Only checks login, not ownership 4. Check get_queryset() → def get_queryset(self): → return Document.objects.all() → Returns ALL documents! 5. Check for has_object_permission() → Not implemented 6. Check retrieve() method → Uses default, which calls get_object() → get_object() uses get_queryset(), which returns all 7. Conclusion: IDOR - Any authenticated user can access any document ``` ### What to look for when tracing ``` Potential gap indicators (investigate further, don't auto-flag): - get_queryset() returns .all() or filters without user - Direct Model.objects.get(pk=pk) without ownership in query - ID comes from request body for sensitive operations - Permission class checks auth but not ownership - No has_object_permission() and queryset isn't scoped Likely safe patterns (but verify the implementation): - get_queryset() filters by request.user or user's org - Custom permission class with has_object_permission() - Base class that enforces scoping - Manager that auto-filters ``` --- ## Phase 5: Report Findings Only report issues you've confirmed through investigation. ### Confidence Levels | Level | Meaning | Action | |-------|---------|--------| | **HIGH** | Traced the flow, confirmed no check exists | Report with evidence | | **MEDIUM** | Check may exist but couldn't confirm | Note for manual verification | | **LOW** | Theoretical, likely mitigated | Do not report | ### Suggested Fixes Must Enforce, Not Document **Bad fix**: Adding a comment saying "caller must validate permissions" **Good fix**: Adding code that actually validates permissions A comment or docstring does not enforce authorization. Your suggested fix must include actual code that: - Validates the user has permission before proceeding - Raises an exception or returns an error if unauthorized - Makes unauthorized access impossible, not just discouraged Example of a BAD fix suggestion: ```python def get_resource(resource_id): # IMPORTANT: Caller must ensure user has access to this resource return Resource.objects.get(pk=resource_id) ``` Example of a GOOD fix suggestion: ```python def get_resource(resource_id, user): resource = Resource.objects.get(pk=resource_id) if resource.owner_id != user.id: raise PermissionDenied("Access denied") return resource ``` If you can't determine the right enforcement mechanism, say so - but never suggest documentation as the fix. ### Report Format ```markdown ## Access Control Review: [Component] ### Authorization Model [Brief description of how this codebase handles authorization] ### Findings #### [IDOR-001] [Title] (Severity: High/Medium) - **Location**: `path/to/file.py:123` - **Confidence**: High - confirmed through code tracing - **The Question**: Can User A access User B's documents? - **Investigation**: 1. Traced GET /api/documents/{pk}/ to DocumentViewSet 2. Checked get_queryset() - returns Document.objects.all() 3. Checked permission_classes - only IsAuthenticated 4. Checked for has_object_permission() - not implemented 5. Verified no relevant middleware or base class checks - **Evidence**: [Code snippet showing the gap] - **Impact**: Any authenticated user can read any document by ID - **Suggested Fix**: [Code that enforces authorization - NOT a comment] ### Needs Manual Verification [Issues where authorization exists but couldn't confirm effectiveness] ### Areas Not Reviewed [Endpoints or flows not covered in this review] ``` --- ## Common Django Authorization Patterns These are patterns you might find - not a checklist to match against. ### Query Scoping ```python # Scoped to user Document.objects.filter(owner=request.user) # Scoped to organization Document.objects.filter(organization=request.user.organization) # Using a custom manager Document.objects.for_user(request.user) # Investigate what this does ``` ### Permission Enforcement ```python # DRF permission classes permission_classes = [IsAuthenticated, IsOwner] # Custom has_object_permission def has_object_permission(self, request, view, obj): return obj.owner == request.user # Django decorators @permission_required('app.view_document') # Manual checks if document.owner != request.user: raise PermissionDenied() ``` ### Ownership Assignment ```python # Server-side (safe) def perform_create(self, serializer): serializer.save(owner=self.request.user) # From request (investigate) serializer.save(**request.data) # Does request.data include owner? ``` --- ## Investigation Checklist Use this to guide your review, not as a pass/fail checklist: ``` □ I understand how authorization is typically implemented in this codebase □ I've identified the ownership model (user, org, tenant, etc.) □ I've mapped the key endpoints that handle user data □ For each sensitive endpoint, I've traced the flow and asked: - Where does the ID come from? - Where is data fetched? - What checks exist between input and data access? □ I've verified my findings by checking parent classes and middleware □ I've only reported issues I've confirmed through investigation ```

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