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技能库 智客分类:安全测试 agent-owasp-compliance

Agent Owasp Compliance

请检查access-date=中的日期值 (帮助) OWASP代理安全倡议十大风险的AI代理密码库. 在以下情况下使用这一技能: - 在生产部署前评估代理系统的安全态势 - 对照OWASP ASI 2026标准进行合规检查 - 将现有安全控制措施映射到10个代理风险中 - 生成安全审查或审计合规报告 - 将代理框架安全特征与标准进行比较 - 任何请求如"我的代理OWASP是否合规?","检查ASI合规",或"代理安全审计"等

1505 安装量

官方网址:skills.sh

技能介绍

先看中文介绍;官方 description 原文单独保留,不改写 SKILL.md。

做什么

请检查access-date=中的日期值 (帮助) OWASP代理安全倡议十大风险的AI代理密码库. 在以下情况下使用这一技能: - 在生产部署前评估代理系统的安全态势 - 对照OWASP ASI 2026标准进行合规检查 - 将现有安全控制措施映射到10个代理风险中 - 生成安全审查或审计合规报告 - 将代理框架安全特征与标准进行比较 - 任何请求如"我的代理OWASP是否合规?","检查ASI合规",或"代理安全审计"等

何时用

官方 description 未单独写出 Use when。按规范,代理会在用户任务与这段 description 的关键词匹配时激活本技能。

代理如何加载

按 Agent Skills 渐进披露:启动时只加载 name 与 description(约 100 token);任务匹配后才读入整份 SKILL.md 正文;scripts/、references/、assets/ 仅在需要时再读。 本文件正文结构:Agent OWASP ASI Compliance Check、Overview、The 10 Risks、Check ASI-01: Prompt Injection Protection、GOOD: Validate before tool execution、BAD: User input goes directly to tool。

文件分析

文件分析:这是一份仅含 SKILL.md 的指令型技能,代理激活后整份正文进入上下文。

官方 description(原文)

Check any AI agent codebase against the OWASP Agentic Security Initiative (ASI) Top 10 risks. Use this skill when: - Evaluating an agent system's security posture before production deployment - Running a compliance check against OWASP ASI 2026 standards - Mapping existing security controls to the 10 agentic risks - Generating a compliance report for security review or audit - Comparing agent framework security features against the standard - Any request like "is my agent OWASP compliant?", "check ASI compliance", or "agentic security audit"

Agent OWASP ASI Compliance CheckOverviewThe 10 RisksCheck ASI-01: Prompt Injection ProtectionGOOD: Validate before tool executionBAD: User input goes directly to toolCheck ASI-02: Insecure Tool UseCheck ASI-03: Excessive AgencyCheck ASI-04: Unauthorized EscalationCheck ASI-05: Trust Boundary ViolationCheck ASI-06: Insufficient LoggingCheck ASI-07: Insecure Identity

来源分类:skills.sh agent-skill

SKILL.md 与 Agent 调用

官方规范 ↗
name
agent-owasp-compliance
description
Check any AI agent codebase against the OWASP Agentic Security Initiative (ASI) Top 10 risks. Use this skill when: - Evaluating an agent system's security posture before production deployment - Running a compliance check against OWASP ASI 2026 standards - Mapping existing security controls to the 10 agentic risks - Generating a compliance report for security review or audit - Comparing agent framework security features against the standard - Any request like "is my agent OWASP compliant?", "check ASI compliance", or "agentic security audit"
  1. 发现技能客户端向 Agent 提供名称与描述目录。
  2. 匹配与调用用户指定或任务匹配后,载入 SKILL.md 指令。
  3. 按需加载按步骤读取参考文档、使用脚本与素材。

具体调用语法与可用工具以目标 Agent 客户端为准。 查看调用机制说明 ↗

安装这个技能

Skills CLI ↗

先选择目标 Agent 和安装范围,保留技能包的附属文件,安装后检查客户端能否发现该技能。

交给 Agent 安装

复制安装指令给支持 Agent Skills 的代理,确认其中的目标目录与客户端匹配。

把 Agent Skill「agent-owasp-compliance」安装到我的项目:SKILL.md 原文与官方 description 见 https://zicq.com/zh/skills/skl-33005c9170128f72-%E7%89%B9%E5%B7%A5Owasp%E5%90%88%E8%A7%84.html
请存为 .cursor/skills/agent-owasp-compliance/SKILL.md 或 .claude/skills/agent-owasp-compliance/SKILL.md,frontmatter 的 name 与 description 保持原样,不要改写。

GitHub 完整包 ↗

终端安装 · Skills CLI

需要 Node.js 与 npx。先查看仓库技能列表,确认实际名称。

npx skills add 'https://github.com/github/awesome-copilot' --list

npx skills add 'https://github.com/github/awesome-copilot' --skill 'agent-owasp-compliance'

CLI 会交互选择目标 Agent,默认安装到项目;用户级安装使用 -g。先通过查看命令核对仓库内容,再用 npx skills list 检查已安装技能。

阅读排版

name: agent-owasp-compliance description: | Check any AI agent codebase against the OWASP Agentic Security Initiative (ASI) Top 10 risks. Use this skill when:

  • Evaluating an agent system's security posture before production deployment
  • Running a compliance check against OWASP ASI 2026 standards
  • Mapping existing security controls to the 10 agentic risks
  • Generating a compliance report for security review or audit
  • Comparing agent framework security features against the standard
  • Any request like "is my agent OWASP compliant?", "check ASI compliance", or "agentic security audit"

Agent OWASP ASI Compliance Check

Evaluate AI agent systems against the OWASP Agentic Security Initiative (ASI) Top 10 — the industry standard for agent security posture.

Overview

The OWASP ASI Top 10 defines the critical security risks specific to autonomous AI agents — not LLMs, not chatbots, but agents that call tools, access systems, and act on behalf of users. This skill checks whether your agent implementation addresses each risk.

Codebase → Scan for each ASI control:
  ASI-01: Prompt Injection Protection
  ASI-02: Tool Use Governance
  ASI-03: Agency Boundaries
  ASI-04: Escalation Controls
  ASI-05: Trust Boundary Enforcement
  ASI-06: Logging & Audit
  ASI-07: Identity Management
  ASI-08: Policy Integrity
  ASI-09: Supply Chain Verification
  ASI-10: Behavioral Monitoring
→ Generate Compliance Report (X/10 covered)

The 10 Risks

| Risk | Name | What to Look For | |------|------|-----------------| | ASI-01 | Prompt Injection | Input validation before tool calls, not just LLM output filtering | | ASI-02 | Insecure Tool Use | Tool allowlists, argument validation, no raw shell execution | | ASI-03 | Excessive Agency | Capability boundaries, scope limits, principle of least privilege | | ASI-04 | Unauthorized Escalation | Privilege checks before sensitive operations, no self-promotion | | ASI-05 | Trust Boundary Violation | Trust verification between agents, signed credentials, no blind trust | | ASI-06 | Insufficient Logging | Structured audit trail for all tool calls, tamper-evident logs | | ASI-07 | Insecure Identity | Cryptographic agent identity, not just string names | | ASI-08 | Policy Bypass | Deterministic policy enforcement, no LLM-based permission checks | | ASI-09 | Supply Chain Integrity | Signed plugins/tools, integrity verification, dependency auditing | | ASI-10 | Behavioral Anomaly | Drift detection, circuit breakers, kill switch capability |


Check ASI-01: Prompt Injection Protection

Look for input validation that runs before tool execution, not after LLM generation.

import re
from pathlib import Path

def check_asi_01(project_path: str) -> dict:
    """ASI-01: Is user input validated before reaching tool execution?"""
    positive_patterns = [
        "input_validation", "validate_input", "sanitize",
        "classify_intent", "prompt_injection", "threat_detect",
        "PolicyEvaluator", "PolicyEngine", "check_content",
    ]
    negative_patterns = [
        r"eval\(", r"exec\(", r"subprocess\.run\(.*shell=True",
        r"os\.system\(",
    ]

    # Scan Python files for signals
    root = Path(project_path)
    positive_matches = []
    negative_matches = []

    for py_file in root.rglob("*.py"):
        content = py_file.read_text(errors="ignore")
        for pattern in positive_patterns:
            if pattern in content:
                positive_matches.append(f"{py_file.name}: {pattern}")
        for pattern in negative_patterns:
            if re.search(pattern, content):
                negative_matches.append(f"{py_file.name}: {pattern}")

    positive_found = len(positive_matches) > 0
    negative_found = len(negative_matches) > 0

    return {
        "risk": "ASI-01",
        "name": "Prompt Injection",
        "status": "pass" if positive_found and not negative_found else "fail",
        "controls_found": positive_matches,
        "vulnerabilities": negative_matches,
        "recommendation": "Add input validation before tool execution, not just output filtering"
    }

What passing looks like:

# GOOD: Validate before tool execution
result = policy_engine.evaluate(user_input)
if result.action == "deny":
    return "Request blocked by policy"
tool_result = await execute_tool(validated_input)

What failing looks like:

# BAD: User input goes directly to tool
tool_result = await execute_tool(user_input)  # No validation

Check ASI-02: Insecure Tool Use

Verify tools have allowlists, argument validation, and no unrestricted execution.

What to search for:

  • Tool registration with explicit allowlists (not open-ended)
  • Argument validation before tool execution
  • No subprocess.run(shell=True) with user-controlled input
  • No eval() or exec() on agent-generated code without sandbox

Passing example:

ALLOWED_TOOLS = {"search", "read_file", "create_ticket"}

def execute_tool(name: str, args: dict):
    if name not in ALLOWED_TOOLS:
        raise PermissionError(f"Tool '{name}' not in allowlist")
    # validate args...
    return tools[name](**validated_args)

Check ASI-03: Excessive Agency

Verify agent capabilities are bounded — not open-ended.

What to search for:

  • Explicit capability lists or execution rings
  • Scope limits on what the agent can access
  • Principle of least privilege applied to tool access

Failing: Agent has access to all tools by default. Passing: Agent capabilities defined as a fixed allowlist, unknown tools denied.


Check ASI-04: Unauthorized Escalation

Verify agents cannot promote their own privileges.

What to search for:

  • Privilege level checks before sensitive operations
  • No self-promotion patterns (agent changing its own trust score or role)
  • Escalation requires external attestation (human or SRE witness)

Failing: Agent can modify its own configuration or permissions. Passing: Privilege changes require out-of-band approval (e.g., Ring 0 requires SRE attestation).


Check ASI-05: Trust Boundary Violation

In multi-agent systems, verify that agents verify each other's identity before accepting instructions.

What to search for:

  • Agent identity verification (DIDs, signed tokens, API keys)
  • Trust score checks before accepting delegated tasks
  • No blind trust of inter-agent messages
  • Delegation narrowing (child scope <= parent scope)

Passing example:

def accept_task(sender_id: str, task: dict):
    trust = trust_registry.get_trust(sender_id)
    if not trust.meets_threshold(0.7):
        raise PermissionError(f"Agent {sender_id} trust too low: {trust.current()}")
    if not verify_signature(task, sender_id):
        raise SecurityError("Task signature verification failed")
    return process_task(task)

Check ASI-06: Insufficient Logging

Verify all agent actions produce structured, tamper-evident audit entries.

What to search for:

  • Structured logging for every tool call (not just print statements)
  • Audit entries include: timestamp, agent ID, tool name, args, result, policy decision
  • Append-only or hash-chained log format
  • Logs stored separately from agent-writable directories

Failing: Agent actions logged via print() or not logged at all. Passing: Structured JSONL audit trail with chain hashes, exported to secure storage.


Check ASI-07: Insecure Identity

Verify agents have cryptographic identity, not just string names.

Failing indicators:

  • Agent identified by agent_name = "my-agent" (string only)
  • No authentication between agents
  • Shared credentials across agents

Passing indicators:

  • DID-based identity (did:web:, did:key:)
  • Ed25519 or similar cryptographic signing
  • Per-agent credentials with rotation
  • Identity bound to specific capabilities

Check ASI-08: Policy Bypass

Verify policy enforcement is deterministic — not LLM-based.

What to search for:

  • Policy evaluation uses deterministic logic (YAML rules, code predicates)
  • No LLM calls in the enforcement path
  • Policy checks cannot be skipped or overridden by the agent
  • Fail-closed behavior (if policy check errors, action is denied)

Failing: Agent decides its own permissions via prompt ("Am I allowed to...?"). Passing: PolicyEvaluator.evaluate() returns allow/deny in <0.1ms, no LLM involved.


Check ASI-09: Supply Chain Integrity

Verify agent plugins and tools have integrity verification.

What to search for:

  • INTEGRITY.json or manifest files with SHA-256 hashes
  • Signature verification on plugin installation
  • Dependency pinning (no @latest, >= without upper bound)
  • SBOM generation

Check ASI-10: Behavioral Anomaly

Verify the system can detect and respond to agent behavioral drift.

What to search for:

  • Circuit breakers that trip on repeated failures
  • Trust score decay over time (temporal decay)
  • Kill switch or emergency stop capability
  • Anomaly detection on tool call patterns (frequency, targets, timing)

Failing: No mechanism to stop a misbehaving agent automatically. Passing: Circuit breaker trips after N failures, trust decays without activity, kill switch available.


Compliance Report Format

# OWASP ASI Compliance Report
Generated: 2026-04-01
Project: my-agent-system

## Summary: 7/10 Controls Covered

| Risk | Status | Finding |
|------|--------|---------|
| ASI-01 Prompt Injection | PASS | PolicyEngine validates input before tool calls |
| ASI-02 Insecure Tool Use | PASS | Tool allowlist enforced in governance.py |
| ASI-03 Excessive Agency | PASS | Execution rings limit capabilities |
| ASI-04 Unauthorized Escalation | PASS | Ring promotion requires attestation |
| ASI-05 Trust Boundary | FAIL | No identity verification between agents |
| ASI-06 Insufficient Logging | PASS | AuditChain with SHA-256 chain hashes |
| ASI-07 Insecure Identity | FAIL | Agents use string names, no crypto identity |
| ASI-08 Policy Bypass | PASS | Deterministic PolicyEvaluator, no LLM in path |
| ASI-09 Supply Chain | FAIL | No integrity manifests or plugin signing |
| ASI-10 Behavioral Anomaly | PASS | Circuit breakers and trust decay active |

## Critical Gaps
- ASI-05: Add agent identity verification using DIDs or signed tokens
- ASI-07: Replace string agent names with cryptographic identity
- ASI-09: Generate INTEGRITY.json manifests for all plugins

## Recommendation
Install agent-governance-toolkit for reference implementations of all 10 controls:
pip install agent-governance-toolkit

Quick Assessment Questions

Use these to rapidly assess an agent system:

  1. Does user input pass through validation before reaching any tool? (ASI-01)
  2. Is there an explicit list of what tools the agent can call? (ASI-02)
  3. Can the agent do anything, or are its capabilities bounded? (ASI-03)
  4. Can the agent promote its own privileges? (ASI-04)
  5. Do agents verify each other's identity before accepting tasks? (ASI-05)
  6. Is every tool call logged with enough detail to replay it? (ASI-06)
  7. Does each agent have a unique cryptographic identity? (ASI-07)
  8. Is policy enforcement deterministic (not LLM-based)? (ASI-08)
  9. Are plugins/tools integrity-verified before use? (ASI-09)
  10. Is there a circuit breaker or kill switch? (ASI-10)

If you answer "no" to any of these, that's a gap to address.


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