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Golang Security

戈兰格的安全最佳做法和预防脆弱性——注射(SQL、指挥、XSS)、密码学、路径穿行、SSRF和HTTP安全头、饼干、机密管理、记忆安全、日志中的PII、STRIDE/DREAD威胁模型,加上 " gosec " SAST、种族探测和模糊测试。 在撰写、审查或审计Go代码时应用安全性,或在接触加密、文件或网络I/O、秘密、用户输入或认证时应用。 不适用于非可探索的防御性缺陷,如:零恐慌或切片别名(-见`Samber/cc-skilling-golang@golang-security'技能)、用govulncheck扫描依赖性脆弱性(-见`Samber/cc-skilling-golang@golang-dependency-management'技能)或将安全扫描仪接入CI管道(-) 见`Samber/cc-skilling-golang@golang-continual-Institution ' 技能.

44850 安装量

官方网址:作者主页

技能介绍

先看中文介绍;官方 description 原文单独保留,不改写 SKILL.md。

做什么

戈兰格的安全最佳做法和预防脆弱性——注射(SQL、指挥、XSS)、密码学、路径穿行、SSRF和HTTP安全头、饼干、机密管理、记忆安全、日志中的PII、STRIDE/DREAD威胁模型,加上 " gosec " SAST、种族探测和模糊测试。 在撰写、审查或审计Go代码时应用安全性,或在接触加密、文件或网络I/O、秘密、用户输入或认证时应用。 不适用于非可探索的防御性缺陷,如:零恐慌或切片别名(-见`Samber/cc-skilling-golang@golang-security'技能)、用govulncheck扫描依赖性脆弱性(-见`Samber/cc-skilling-golang@golang-dependency-management'技能)或将安全扫描仪接入CI管道(-) 见`Samber/cc-skilling-golang@golang-continual-Institution ' 技能.

何时用

编写新的代码或修复报告的脆弱性。 遵循技能的相继指引. 可选地推出背景代理,用于新写出代码中常见脆弱性模式的grep,而主要代理则继续实施该特性

代理如何加载

按 Agent Skills 渐进披露:启动时只加载 name 与 description(约 100 token);任务匹配后才读入整份 SKILL.md 正文;scripts/、references/、assets/ 仅在需要时再读。 本文件正文结构:Go Security、Overview、Security Thinking Model、Severity Levels、Research Before Reporting、Threat Modeling (STRIDE)。

文件分析

文件分析:除 SKILL.md 外,正文引用了 references/threat-modeling.md、references/cryptography.md、references/injection.md、references/filesystem.md、references/network.md、references/cookies.md,属于带资源的技能包,这些文件按需再读。

官方 description(原文)

Security best practices and vulnerability prevention for Golang — injection (SQL, command, XSS), cryptography, path traversal, SSRF and HTTP security headers, cookies, secrets management, memory safety, PII in logs, STRIDE/DREAD threat modeling, plus `gosec` SAST, race detection, and fuzz testing. Apply when writing, reviewing, or auditing Go code for security, or when touching crypto, file or network I/O, secrets, user input, or authentication. Not for non-exploitable defensive bugs such as nil panics or slice aliasing (→ See `samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-safety` skill), dependency vulnerability scanning with govulncheck (→ See `samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-dependency-management` skill), or wiring security scanners into CI pipelines (→ See `samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-continuous-integration` skill).

Go SecurityOverviewSecurity Thinking ModelSeverity LevelsResearch Before ReportingThreat Modeling (STRIDE)Quick ReferenceDetailed CategoriesCode Review ChecklistTooling & VerificationStatic Analysis & LintingGo security checker (SAST)

兼容:Designed for Claude Code, Codex or similar harness, and for projects using Golang. · 许可:MIT · allowed-tools:Read Edit Write Glob Grep Bash(go:*) Bash(golangci-lint:*) Bash(git:*) Agent WebFetch Bash(govulncheck:*) WebSearch AskUserQuestion EnterWorktree ExitWorktree

来源分类:skills.sh agent-skill

SKILL.md 与 Agent 调用

官方规范 ↗
name
golang-security
description
Security best practices and vulnerability prevention for Golang — injection (SQL, command, XSS), cryptography, path traversal, SSRF and HTTP security headers, cookies, secrets management, memory safety, PII in logs, STRIDE/DREAD threat modeling, plus `gosec` SAST, race detection, and fuzz testing. Apply when writing, reviewing, or auditing Go code for security, or when touching crypto, file or network I/O, secrets, user input, or authentication. Not for non-exploitable defensive bugs such as nil panics or slice aliasing (→ See `samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-safety` skill), dependency vulnerability scanning with govulncheck (→ See `samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-dependency-management` skill), or wiring security scanners into CI pipelines (→ See `samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-continuous-integration` skill).
compatibility
Designed for Claude Code, Codex or similar harness, and for projects using Golang.
allowed-tools
Read Edit Write Glob Grep Bash(go:*) Bash(golangci-lint:*) Bash(git:*) Agent WebFetch Bash(govulncheck:*) WebSearch AskUserQuestion EnterWorktree ExitWorktree实验字段,支持情况取决于客户端;字段声明本身不会授予工具权限。
许可
MIT
  1. 发现技能客户端向 Agent 提供名称与描述目录。
  2. 匹配与调用用户指定或任务匹配后,载入 SKILL.md 指令。
  3. 按需加载按步骤读取参考文档、使用脚本与素材。
指令中引用的文件 · 10
  • references/threat-modeling.md
  • references/cryptography.md
  • references/injection.md
  • references/filesystem.md
  • references/network.md
  • references/cookies.md
  • references/third-party.md
  • references/memory-safety.md
  • references/secrets.md
  • references/logging.md

以下路径提取自原文;文件是否齐全请以来源仓库中的完整目录为准。

具体调用语法与可用工具以目标 Agent 客户端为准。 查看调用机制说明 ↗

安装这个技能

Skills CLI ↗

先选择目标 Agent 和安装范围,保留技能包的附属文件,安装后检查客户端能否发现该技能。

该技能引用了附属文件,请从来源获取完整目录;仅复制 SKILL.md 可能缺少依赖。

交给 Agent 安装

复制安装指令给支持 Agent Skills 的代理,确认其中的目标目录与客户端匹配。

把 Agent Skill「golang-security」安装到我的项目:SKILL.md 原文与官方 description 见 https://zicq.com/zh/skills/skl-61411a66cf7cd677-%E6%88%88%E5%85%B0%E5%85%8B.html
请存为 .cursor/skills/golang-security/SKILL.md 或 .claude/skills/golang-security/SKILL.md,frontmatter 的 name 与 description 保持原样,不要改写。
该技能还带 scripts/、references/、assets/ 等文件,请从 https://github.com/samber/cc-skills-golang 取完整目录,不要只建一个 SKILL.md。

GitHub 完整包 ↗

终端安装 · Skills CLI

需要 Node.js 与 npx。先查看仓库技能列表,确认实际名称。

npx skills add 'https://github.com/samber/cc-skills-golang' --list

npx skills add 'https://github.com/samber/cc-skills-golang' --skill 'golang-security'

CLI 会交互选择目标 Agent,默认安装到项目;用户级安装使用 -g。先通过查看命令核对仓库内容,再用 npx skills list 检查已安装技能。

阅读排版

name: golang-security description: "Security best practices and vulnerability prevention for Golang — injection (SQL, command, XSS), cryptography, path traversal, SSRF and HTTP security headers, cookies, secrets management, memory safety, PII in logs, STRIDE/DREAD threat modeling, plus gosec SAST, race detection, and fuzz testing. Apply when writing, reviewing, or auditing Go code for security, or when touching crypto, file or network I/O, secrets, user input, or authentication. Not for non-exploitable defensive bugs such as nil panics or slice aliasing (→ See samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-safety skill), dependency vulnerability scanning with govulncheck (→ See samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-dependency-management skill), or wiring security scanners into CI pipelines (→ See samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-continuous-integration skill)." user-invocable: true license: MIT compatibility: Designed for Claude Code, Codex or similar harness, and for projects using Golang. metadata: author: samber version: "1.2.2" openclaw: emoji: "🔒" homepage: https://github.com/samber/cc-skills-golang requires: bins: - go - govulncheck install: - kind: go package: golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@latest bins: [govulncheck] allowed-tools: Read Edit Write Glob Grep Bash(go:) Bash(golangci-lint:) Bash(git:) Agent WebFetch Bash(govulncheck:) WebSearch AskUserQuestion EnterWorktree ExitWorktree paths:

  • "**/*.go"

Persona: You are a senior Go security engineer. You apply security thinking both when auditing existing code and when writing new code — threats are easier to prevent than to fix.

Thinking mode: Reason as thoroughly as possible for security audits and vulnerability analysis — security bugs hide in subtle interactions and deep reasoning catches what surface-level review misses. On Claude Code, use ultrathink to trigger extended thinking explicitly.

Orchestration mode: Fan out the five vulnerability-domain sub-agents described in Audit mode as a fan-out-then-synthesize workflow for a full-codebase security audit. Parallelism covers more attack surface per pass; the synthesis step deduplicates findings and ranks them by severity. On Claude Code, use ultracode to opt into multi-agent orchestration explicitly.

Modes:

  • Review mode — reviewing a PR for security issues. Start from the changed files, then trace call sites and data flows into adjacent code — a vulnerability may live outside the diff but be triggered by it. Sequential.
  • Audit mode — full codebase security scan. Launch up to 5 parallel sub-agents, each covering an independent vulnerability domain: (1) injection patterns, (2) cryptography and secrets, (3) web security and headers, (4) authentication and authorization, (5) concurrency safety and dependency vulnerabilities. Aggregate findings, score with DREAD, and report by severity. A large audit produces many independent findings — apply each fix/improvement in its own isolated worktree, so one fix = one worktree = one focused, reviewable, independently revertible PR, instead of one large mixed-concern change.
  • Coding mode — use when writing new code or fixing a reported vulnerability. Follow the skill's sequential guidance. Optionally launch a background agent to grep for common vulnerability patterns in newly written code while the main agent continues implementing the feature.

Dependencies:

  • govulncheck: go install golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@latest

Go Security

Overview

Security in Go follows the principle of defense in depth: protect at multiple layers, validate all inputs, use secure defaults, and leverage the standard library's security-aware design. Go's type system and concurrency model provide some inherent protections, but vigilance is still required.

Security Thinking Model

Before writing or reviewing code, ask three questions:

  1. What are the trust boundaries? — Where does untrusted data enter the system? (HTTP requests, file uploads, environment variables, database rows written by other services)
  2. What can an attacker control? — Which inputs flow into sensitive operations? (SQL queries, shell commands, HTML output, file paths, cryptographic operations)
  3. What is the blast radius? — If this defense fails, what's the worst outcome? (Data leak, RCE, privilege escalation, denial of service)

Severity Levels

| Level | DREAD | Meaning | | --- | --- | --- | | Critical | 8-10 | RCE, full data breach, credential theft — fix immediately | | High | 6-7.9 | Auth bypass, significant data exposure, broken crypto — fix in current sprint | | Medium | 4-5.9 | Limited exposure, session issues, defense weakening — fix in next sprint | | Low | 1-3.9 | Minor info disclosure, best-practice deviations — fix opportunistically |

Levels align with DREAD scoring.

Research Before Reporting

Before flagging a security issue, trace the full data flow through the codebase — don't assess a code snippet in isolation.

  1. Trace the data origin — follow the variable back to where it enters the system. Is it user input, a hardcoded constant, or an internal-only value?
  2. Check for upstream validation — look for input validation, sanitization, type parsing, or allow-listing earlier in the call chain.
  3. Examine the trust boundary — if the data never crosses a trust boundary (e.g., internal service-to-service with mTLS), the risk profile is different.
  4. Read the surrounding code, not just the diff — middleware, interceptors, or wrapper functions may already provide a layer of defense.

Severity adjustment, not dismissal: upstream protection does not eliminate a finding — defense in depth means every layer should protect itself. But it changes severity: a SQL concatenation reachable only through a strict input parser is medium, not critical. Always report the finding with adjusted severity and note which upstream defenses exist and what would happen if they were removed or bypassed.

When downgrading or skipping a finding: add a brief inline comment (e.g., // security: SQL concat safe here — input is validated by parseUserID() which returns int) so the decision is documented, reviewable, and won't be re-flagged by future audits.

Threat Modeling (STRIDE)

Apply STRIDE to every trust boundary crossing and data flow in your system: Spoofing (authentication), Tampering (integrity), Repudiation (audit logging), Information Disclosure (encryption), Denial of Service (rate limiting), Elevation of Privilege (authorization). Score each threat using DREAD (Damage, Reproducibility, Exploitability, Affected users, Discoverability) to prioritize remediation — Critical (8-10) demands immediate action.

For the full methodology with Go examples, DFD trust boundaries, DREAD scoring, and OWASP Top 10 mapping, see Threat Modeling Guide.

Quick Reference

| Severity | Vulnerability | Defense | Standard Library Solution | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Critical | SQL Injection | Parameterized queries separate data from code | database/sql with ? placeholders | | Critical | Command Injection | Pass args separately, never via shell concatenation | exec.Command with separate args | | High | XSS | Auto-escaping renders user data as text, not HTML/JS | html/template, text/template | | High | Path Traversal | Scope untrusted file access to an allowed root | Go 1.24+: use os.Root. Pre-Go 1.24: use filepath.IsLocal + filepath.Rel + separator-aware checks; never rely on filepath.Clean + strings.HasPrefix alone. | | Medium | Timing Attacks | Constant-time comparison avoids byte-by-byte leaks | crypto/subtle.ConstantTimeCompare | | High | Crypto Issues | Use vetted algorithms; never roll your own | crypto/aes, crypto/rand | | Medium | HTTP Security | TLS + security headers prevent downgrade attacks | net/http, configure TLSConfig | | Low | Missing Headers | HSTS, CSP, X-Frame-Options prevent browser attacks | Security headers middleware | | Medium | Rate Limiting | Rate limits prevent brute-force and resource exhaustion | golang.org/x/time/rate, server timeouts | | High | Race Conditions | Protect shared state to prevent data corruption | sync.Mutex, channels, avoid shared state |

Detailed Categories

For complete examples, code snippets, and CWE mappings, see:

Code Review Checklist

For the full security review checklist organized by domain (input handling, database, crypto, web, auth, errors, dependencies, concurrency), see Security Review Checklist — a comprehensive checklist for code review with coverage of all major vulnerability categories.

Tooling & Verification

Static Analysis & Linting

Security-relevant linters: bodyclose, sqlclosecheck, nilerr, errcheck, govet, staticcheck. See the samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-lint skill for configuration and usage.

For deeper security-specific analysis:

# Go security checker (SAST)
go get -tool github.com/securego/gosec/v2/cmd/gosec@latest
go tool gosec ./...

# Vulnerability scanner — see golang-dependency-management for full govulncheck usage
go get -tool golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@latest
go tool govulncheck ./...

To check the known CVEs of a specific module or version without scanning the whole tree (e.g. when vetting a dependency on pkg.go.dev), → See samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-pkg-go-dev skill.

Security Testing

# Race detector
go test -race ./...

# Fuzz testing
go test -fuzz=Fuzz

Common Mistakes

| Severity | Mistake | Fix | | --- | --- | --- | | High | math/rand for tokens | Output is predictable — attacker can reproduce the sequence. Use crypto/rand | | Critical | SQL string concatenation | Attacker can modify query logic. Parameterized queries keep data and code separate | | Critical | exec.Command("bash -c") | Shell interprets metacharacters (;, \|, `). Pass args separately to avoid shell parsing | | High | Trusting unsanitized input | Validate at trust boundaries — internal code trusts the boundary, so catching bad input there protects everything | | Critical | Hardcoded secrets | Secrets in source code end up in version history, CI logs, and backups. Use env vars or secret managers | | Medium | Comparing secrets with == | == short-circuits on first differing byte, leaking timing info. Use crypto/subtle.ConstantTimeCompare | | Medium | Returning detailed errors | Stack traces and DB errors help attackers map your system. Return generic messages, log details server-side | | High | Ignoring -race findings | Races cause data corruption and can bypass authorization checks under concurrency. Fix all races | | High | MD5/SHA1 for passwords | Both have known collision attacks and are fast to brute-force. Use Argon2id or bcrypt (intentionally slow, memory-hard) | | High | AES without GCM | ECB/CBC modes lack authentication — attacker can modify ciphertext undetected. GCM provides encrypt+authenticate | | Medium | Binding to 0.0.0.0 | Exposes service to all network interfaces. Bind to specific interface to limit attack surface |

Security Anti-Patterns

| Severity | Anti-Pattern | Why It Fails | Fix | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | High | Security through obscurity | Hidden URLs are discoverable via fuzzing, logs, or source | Authentication + authorization on all endpoints | | High | Trusting client headers | X-Forwarded-For, X-Is-Admin are trivially forged | Server-side identity verification | | High | Client-side authorization | JavaScript checks are bypassed by any HTTP client | Server-side permission checks on every handler | | High | Shared secrets across envs | Staging breach compromises production | Per-environment secrets via secret manager | | Critical | Ignoring crypto errors | _, _ = encrypt(data) silently proceeds unencrypted | Always check errors — fail closed, never open | | Critical | Rolling your own crypto | Custom encryption hasn't been analyzed by cryptographers | Use crypto/aes GCM, golang.org/x/crypto/argon2 |

See Security Architecture for detailed anti-patterns with Go code examples.

Cross-References

See samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-database, samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-safety, samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-observability, samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-continuous-integration skills.

  • → See samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-continuous-integration skill for automated AI-driven code review in CI using these guidelines

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