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技能库 智客分类:Agent 工作流 multi-account-isolation

Multi Account Isolation

诚然,布朗人实际上对彼此负责,无人对对方负责,无人对孩子的死亡负责.

133786 安装量

官方网址:skills.sh

技能介绍

先看中文介绍;官方 description 原文单独保留,不改写 SKILL.md。

做什么

验证浏览器配置文件是否实际上相互隔离,而不是假设 - 确认每个配置文件的时区与自己的退出 IP 一致, WebRTC 仅曝光代理, 画布和 WebGL 散列在重新启用一个配置文件时保持不变, 没有两个配置文件共享一个人物、一个饼干罐或地址

何时用

您的多个账户或测试身份从一个机器运行, 设置需要检查, 当一个配置文件测试干净但有东西仍然关闭时, 当选择要运行的检测套件( CreepJS, whoer, 浏览器Leaks WebRTC, 像素扫描, liarjs) , 当审计什么

代理如何加载

按 Agent Skills 渐进披露:启动时只加载 name 与 description(约 100 token);任务匹配后才读入整份 SKILL.md 正文;scripts/、references/、assets/ 仅在需要时再读。 本文件正文结构:Profile Isolation - verifying it, not assuming it、The configuration invariant、Setup under test、The checks、Reading a failure、What the runtime touches, and how to check it。

文件分析

文件分析:这是一份仅含 SKILL.md 的指令型技能,代理激活后整份正文进入上下文。

官方 description(原文)

Verify that browser profiles are actually isolated from one another instead of assuming it - confirm each profile's timezone agrees with its own exit IP, that WebRTC exposes only the proxy, that canvas and WebGL hashes stay identical across relaunches of one profile, and that no two profiles share a persona, a cookie jar, or an address. Use when several of your own accounts or test identities run from one machine and the setup needs checking, when a profile tested clean but something still looks off, when choosing which detection suites to run (CreepJS, whoer, browserleaks WebRTC, pixelscan, liarjs), when auditing what a vendor runtime does with API and proxy credentials, or when asking which layers browser isolation cannot cover at all. Also for 'profile isolation check', 'fingerprint consistency test', 'timezone mismatch', 'WebRTC leak', 'canvas hash unstable', 'account association', 'temporary profile', '防关联', '多账号', '隔离自检'. The SDK is anti-detect-browser; MCP is browser-mcp-agent.

Profile Isolation - verifying it, not assuming itThe configuration invariantSetup under testThe checksReading a failureWhat the runtime touches, and how to check itWhat isolation cannot coverAcceptable useRelated Skills

· 许可:MIT

来源分类:skills.sh agent-skill

SKILL.md 与 Agent 调用

官方规范 ↗
name
multi-account-isolation
description
Verify that browser profiles are actually isolated from one another instead of assuming it - confirm each profile's timezone agrees with its own exit IP, that WebRTC exposes only the proxy, that canvas and WebGL hashes stay identical across relaunches of one profile, and that no two profiles share a persona, a cookie jar, or an address. Use when several of your own accounts or test identities run from one machine and the setup needs checking, when a profile tested clean but something still looks off, when choosing which detection suites to run (CreepJS, whoer, browserleaks WebRTC, pixelscan, liarjs), when auditing what a vendor runtime does with API and proxy credentials, or when asking which layers browser isolation cannot cover at all. Also for 'profile isolation check', 'fingerprint consistency test', 'timezone mismatch', 'WebRTC leak', 'canvas hash unstable', 'account association', 'temporary profile', '防关联', '多账号', '隔离自检'. The SDK is anti-detect-browser; MCP is browser-mcp-agent.
许可
MIT
  1. 发现技能客户端向 Agent 提供名称与描述目录。
  2. 匹配与调用用户指定或任务匹配后,载入 SKILL.md 指令。
  3. 按需加载按步骤读取参考文档、使用脚本与素材。

具体调用语法与可用工具以目标 Agent 客户端为准。 查看调用机制说明 ↗

安装这个技能

Skills CLI ↗

先选择目标 Agent 和安装范围,保留技能包的附属文件,安装后检查客户端能否发现该技能。

交给 Agent 安装

复制安装指令给支持 Agent Skills 的代理,确认其中的目标目录与客户端匹配。

把 Agent Skill「multi-account-isolation」安装到我的项目:SKILL.md 原文与官方 description 见 https://zicq.com/zh/skills/skl-67451e89b8b8d883-%E5%A4%9A%E8%B4%A6%E6%88%B7%E9%9A%94%E7%A6%BB.html
请存为 .cursor/skills/multi-account-isolation/SKILL.md 或 .claude/skills/multi-account-isolation/SKILL.md,frontmatter 的 name 与 description 保持原样,不要改写。

GitHub 完整包 ↗

终端安装 · Skills CLI

需要 Node.js 与 npx。先查看仓库技能列表,确认实际名称。

npx skills add 'https://github.com/antibrow/anti-detect-browser-skills' --list

npx skills add 'https://github.com/antibrow/anti-detect-browser-skills' --skill 'multi-account-isolation'

CLI 会交互选择目标 Agent,默认安装到项目;用户级安装使用 -g。先通过查看命令核对仓库内容,再用 npx skills list 检查已安装技能。

阅读排版
--- name: multi-account-isolation description: Verify that browser profiles are actually isolated from one another instead of assuming it - confirm each profile's timezone agrees with its own exit IP, that WebRTC exposes only the proxy, that canvas and WebGL hashes stay identical across relaunches of one profile, and that no two profiles share a persona, a cookie jar, or an address. Use when several of your own accounts or test identities run from one machine and the setup needs checking, when a profile tested clean but something still looks off, when choosing which detection suites to run (CreepJS, whoer, browserleaks WebRTC, pixelscan, liarjs), when auditing what a vendor runtime does with API and proxy credentials, or when asking which layers browser isolation cannot cover at all. Also for 'profile isolation check', 'fingerprint consistency test', 'timezone mismatch', 'WebRTC leak', 'canvas hash unstable', 'account association', 'temporary profile', '防关联', '多账号', '隔离自检'. The SDK is anti-detect-browser; MCP is browser-mcp-agent. license: MIT --- # Profile Isolation - verifying it, not assuming it A profile that *looks* isolated usually is not. The failures are boring and mechanical: a timezone that does not match the exit IP, a WebRTC candidate carrying the real address, a canvas hash that changes on every read, two profiles that ended up on the same persona. This skill is the check list for catching those before they matter. > **Authorized use only.** This is for identities you own or are authorized to operate: your own accounts, your own test fixtures, your own QA fleet, and your own anti-fraud stack. It is not for accessing systems without authorization, for accounts that are not yours, or for creating fake accounts or engagement. Comply with the terms of the sites you automate and with applicable law - see [Acceptable use](#acceptable-use). **What this does not claim.** Passing every check below means the browser layer is internally consistent. It does not mean a given site will treat two profiles as unrelated: things entirely outside the browser - a shared payment instrument, a shared contact detail, identical activity patterns - are not something any browser setting reaches. Treat a clean result as "the technical layer is not the problem", not as a guarantee. For the SDK that creates and launches these profiles, see the **anti-detect-browser** skill. ## The configuration invariant One identity gets one of everything. Any cell shared between two identities is a defect to find: ``` identity → profile → persona → proxy → timezone 1 : 1 : 1 : 1 : 1 ``` Profiles are unlimited and free on every antibrow plan, so there is never a reason to reuse one. "Log out and log back in as the other identity" inside one profile defeats the entire setup - the cookie jar and `localStorage` are the point. ## Setup under test ```typescript import { AntiDetectBrowser } from 'anti-detect-browser' const ab = new AntiDetectBrowser({ key: process.env.ANTI_DETECT_BROWSER_KEY }) const identities = [ { profile: 'fixture-us-01', proxy: process.env.PROXY_US_1, tags: ['Windows 10', 'Chrome'] }, { profile: 'fixture-us-02', proxy: process.env.PROXY_US_2, tags: ['Apple Mac', 'Safari'] }, { profile: 'fixture-de-01', proxy: process.env.PROXY_DE_1, tags: ['Windows 10', 'Edge'] }, ] for (const id of identities) { const { browser, page } = await ab.launch({ profile: id.profile, // isolated cookies, storage, login state proxy: id.proxy, // from the environment, one per identity fingerprint: { tags: id.tags }, // drawn once, frozen, replayed after label: id.profile, // address-bar tag drawn by the kernel, unreadable from the page }) // ... run the checks below, then ... await browser.close() } ``` Python, same on-disk profile format: ```python import os from antibrow import launch with launch( profile="fixture-us-01", proxy=os.environ["PROXY_US_1"], # from the environment, never a literal geoip=True, # timezone + WebRTC follow the proxy exit label="fixture-us-01", ) as browser: page = browser.new_page() print(browser.timezone, browser.public_ip) ``` ## The checks Run each profile **through its own proxy**, and assert rather than eyeball. | # | Check | How | Fails when | |---|---|---|---| | 1 | Timezone matches the exit IP | `browser.timezone` vs the country of `browser.public_ip` | `geoip` was disabled, or `timezone` was forced to something the IP contradicts. This is the single most common defect. | | 2 | WebRTC exposes only the proxy | [browserleaks.com/webrtc](https://browserleaks.com/webrtc) | ICE candidates still carry a local or real public address | | 3 | Canvas hash is stable across launches | Read it, close, relaunch the same profile, read again | The two reads differ - a value that changes every read is itself an anomaly, and it means the persona is not frozen | | 4 | Worker and main thread agree | [CreepJS](https://abrahamjuliot.github.io/creepjs/) | UA, `languages`, `hardwareConcurrency`, timezone or GPU differ when re-read inside a Web Worker | | 5 | One GPU across three interfaces | CreepJS, or read WebGL / WebGL2 / WebGPU directly | `adapter.info.vendor` does not match the unmasked WebGL renderer family | | 6 | No two profiles share a persona | Diff `browser.persona` across the fleet | Two profiles report the same UA, screen geometry and seeds | | 7 | No two profiles share an address | Collect `browser.public_ip` for the fleet | Two identities came out of the same exit, or the same /24 | | 8 | Cookie jars are separate | Compare `browser.profile_dir` across the fleet, then inspect `user-data/` inside each | Two identities resolve to one directory, or one directory holds state belonging to another identity | | 9 | One identity, one profile tree | Confirm every launch of a name passes the same `temporary` value | A managed `gmail` and a temporary `gmail` are two different profiles with two personas and two cookie jars. A script that disagrees with itself about `temporary` is running two identities under one name and will look like a logged-out session, not like a bug | | 10 | Whole-stack coherence | [whoer.net](https://whoer.net), [pixelscan.net](https://pixelscan.net) | IP, timezone and locale disagree at a glance | | 11 | Consistency rules in CI | `npx liarjs` ([liarjs.dev](https://liarjs.dev)) | Any of ~40 open-source cross-layer rules fail - this is the one that runs unattended | Checks 1, 3 and 7 are the ones worth wiring into CI: they are cheap, deterministic, and they catch the defects that actually recur. ## Reading a failure Work down in this order, cheapest first - a fingerprint is almost never the actual cause: 1. **Profile name reused?** `list_profiles`, or compare `browser.profile_dir` per identity. Two identities in one directory explains everything else. Directories are named after the profile's id, not its name, so match on `profile.json` inside rather than on the folder name. 2. **Same address twice?** Confirm each `public_ip` is distinct. 3. **Clock disagrees with the address?** Print `browser.timezone` and `browser.public_ip` together. 4. **Persona regenerated?** If the canvas hash moved between launches, the profile is not frozen - check whether `profile_dir` or the cache directory changed under it. 5. **Only then** the fingerprint itself, verified with the suites above rather than assumed. ## What the runtime touches, and how to check it Any tool that drives logged-in sessions receives cookies and proxy credentials, so it is fair to ask what it does with them. For antibrow: | Artifact | Where it lives | Who sees it | |---|---|---| | Cookies, `localStorage`, login state | `~/.anti-detect-browser/profiles//user-data/` on your disk, or `profiles-temp//` for a temporary profile | Local. Cloud sync is opt-in per profile: a launch never creates a cloud profile by itself, and `sync: true` is what puts one there. Check which profiles sync before assuming they stay on the machine | | Persona (`persona.json`) | same profile directory, written once and frozen | Local | | Profile identity record (`profile.json`) | same profile directory; the id it holds is what names the directory | Local. It is why a rename does not cost a persona, and why the folder name is not the profile name | | Proxy URL and its credentials | passed to the kernel at launch; answered in the network stack (HTTP 407 / SOCKS5 RFC 1929) so no extension holds them | The kernel process and your proxy provider | | API key | your environment, or `~/.antibrow/license.key` | Exchanged with `antibrow.com` for a short-lived license token, roughly once a day | The kernel is a closed-source Chromium build - that is the tradeoff for the spoofing living in C++ rather than in an injectable script - so verify behaviour rather than take it on faith: ```bash python -m antibrow info # kernels, profiles, license state, cache dir ``` ```python browser.plan.redacted_args() # exact kernel command line, secrets masked - safe to paste in a bug report ``` Point it at a proxy whose logs you can read, or at a local MITM proxy, and watch what leaves the machine during a launch. Pin the SDK version and check the published hash (`npm view [email protected] dist.integrity`) so the code you audited is the code that runs. If a deployment must not phone home at all, this is the wrong tool: license verification is compiled into the kernel and there is no offline mode. ## What isolation cannot cover Worth stating plainly, because a clean check list invites the wrong conclusion: - **Anything outside the browser.** A shared payment instrument, a shared contact detail, a shared payout destination - no browser setting touches these, and they are the strongest correlators that exist. - **Activity patterns.** Identical timing, identical content, identical interaction targets. Not a technical property. - **Identity verification.** A document check is not a fingerprint problem. - **A platform's own decision.** Nothing here changes how a site chooses to treat an account. If every check passes and something still looks wrong, the cause is in this list, not in the browser layer. ## Acceptable use **Intended:** verifying isolation between identities you own; running client accounts with the account holder's authorization; building QA fixtures that emulate distinct devices; testing your own anti-fraud and correlation logic; auditing what a browser runtime does with your credentials. **Out of scope, and not supported:** accessing any system without authorization; logging into accounts that are not yours; credential stuffing or account takeover; creating fake accounts, reviews or engagement; circumventing an authentication, payment or authorization control; scraping personal data in violation of applicable law; working around a platform's enforcement decision. Complying with the terms of the platforms being used, and with applicable law, is the operator's responsibility. Report abuse or a security issue via the contact at `https://antibrow.com`. ## Related Skills - **anti-detect-browser** - the SDK, profiles, personas, proxies and REST API that create the setup being verified here - **browser-mcp-agent** - MCP server mode, for letting an AI agent drive a single profile itself

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