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技能库 智客分类:Agent 工作流 ctf-web

Ctf Web

为CTF挑战提供网络开发技术. 当目标主要为HTTP应用程序时使用,API,浏览器客户端,模板引擎,身份流,或智能合同前端/后端表面,包括XSS,SQLi,STI,SSF,XXE,JWT,认证绕行,文件上传,请求走私,OAuth/OIDC,SAML,原型污染等类似网络错误. 不要用于本土二进制内存腐败,独立可执行文件的倒置工程,磁盘或内存法证,或纯密码分析,除非网络缺陷仍然是通向旗帜的主要路径.

10451 安装量

官方网址:skills.sh

技能介绍

先看中文介绍;官方 description 原文单独保留,不改写 SKILL.md。

做什么

为真相和友谊委员会的挑战提供网络开发技术

何时用

目标主要是HTTP应用程序,API,浏览器客户端,模板引擎,身份流,或智能合同前端/后端表面,包括XSS,SQLi,STI,SSF,XXE,JWT,认证绕行,文件上传,请求走私,OAuth/OIDC,SAML,原型污染等类似功能

代理如何加载

按 Agent Skills 渐进披露:启动时只加载 name 与 description(约 100 token);任务匹配后才读入整份 SKILL.md 正文;scripts/、references/、assets/ 仅在需要时再读。 本文件正文结构:CTF Web Exploitation、Prerequisites、Additional Resources、When to Pivot、First-Pass Workflow、Bulk payloads (PayloadsAllTheThings — on-demand)。 其中含规范建议的小节:分步指令。

文件分析

文件分析:除 SKILL.md 外,正文引用了 scripts/install_ctf_tools.sh,属于带资源的技能包,这些文件按需再读。

官方 description(原文)

Provides web exploitation techniques for CTF challenges. Use when the target is primarily an HTTP application, API, browser client, template engine, identity flow, or smart-contract frontend/backend surface, including XSS, SQLi, SSTI, SSRF, XXE, JWT, auth bypass, file upload, request smuggling, OAuth/OIDC, SAML, prototype pollution, and similar web bugs. Do not use it for native binary memory corruption, reverse engineering of standalone executables, disk or memory forensics, or pure cryptanalysis unless the web flaw is still the main path to the flag.

CTF Web ExploitationPrerequisitesAdditional ResourcesWhen to PivotFirst-Pass WorkflowBulk payloads (PayloadsAllTheThings — on-demand)PAT payload search (requires PAT clone — see Prerequisites; gracefully skipped if missing)Quick Start CommandsReconSQLi quick testJWT decode (no verification)Cookie decode (Flask)

兼容:Requires filesystem-based agent (Claude Code or similar) with bash, Python 3, and internet access for tool installation. · 许可:MIT · allowed-tools:Bash Read Write Edit Glob Grep Task WebFetch WebSearch

来源分类:skills.sh agent-skill

SKILL.md 与 Agent 调用

官方规范 ↗
name
ctf-web
description
Provides web exploitation techniques for CTF challenges. Use when the target is primarily an HTTP application, API, browser client, template engine, identity flow, or smart-contract frontend/backend surface, including XSS, SQLi, SSTI, SSRF, XXE, JWT, auth bypass, file upload, request smuggling, OAuth/OIDC, SAML, prototype pollution, and similar web bugs. Do not use it for native binary memory corruption, reverse engineering of standalone executables, disk or memory forensics, or pure cryptanalysis unless the web flaw is still the main path to the flag.
compatibility
Requires filesystem-based agent (Claude Code or similar) with bash, Python 3, and internet access for tool installation.
allowed-tools
Bash Read Write Edit Glob Grep Task WebFetch WebSearch实验字段,支持情况取决于客户端;字段声明本身不会授予工具权限。
许可
MIT
  1. 发现技能客户端向 Agent 提供名称与描述目录。
  2. 匹配与调用用户指定或任务匹配后,载入 SKILL.md 指令。
  3. 按需加载按步骤读取参考文档、使用脚本与素材。
指令中引用的文件 · 1
  • scripts/install_ctf_tools.sh

以下路径提取自原文;文件是否齐全请以来源仓库中的完整目录为准。

具体调用语法与可用工具以目标 Agent 客户端为准。 查看调用机制说明 ↗

安装这个技能

Skills CLI ↗

先选择目标 Agent 和安装范围,保留技能包的附属文件,安装后检查客户端能否发现该技能。

该技能引用了附属文件,请从来源获取完整目录;仅复制 SKILL.md 可能缺少依赖。

交给 Agent 安装

复制安装指令给支持 Agent Skills 的代理,确认其中的目标目录与客户端匹配。

把 Agent Skill「ctf-web」安装到我的项目:SKILL.md 原文与官方 description 见 https://zicq.com/zh/skills/skl-6d5aa4dcb0614167-%E7%BD%91%E7%BB%9C.html
请存为 .cursor/skills/ctf-web/SKILL.md 或 .claude/skills/ctf-web/SKILL.md,frontmatter 的 name 与 description 保持原样,不要改写。
该技能还带 scripts/、references/、assets/ 等文件,请从 https://github.com/ljagiello/ctf-skills 取完整目录,不要只建一个 SKILL.md。

GitHub 完整包 ↗

终端安装 · Skills CLI

需要 Node.js 与 npx。先查看仓库技能列表,确认实际名称。

npx skills add 'https://github.com/ljagiello/ctf-skills' --list

npx skills add 'https://github.com/ljagiello/ctf-skills' --skill 'ctf-web'

CLI 会交互选择目标 Agent,默认安装到项目;用户级安装使用 -g。先通过查看命令核对仓库内容,再用 npx skills list 检查已安装技能。

阅读排版
--- name: ctf-web description: Provides web exploitation techniques for CTF challenges. Use when the target is primarily an HTTP application, API, browser client, template engine, identity flow, or smart-contract frontend/backend surface, including XSS, SQLi, SSTI, SSRF, XXE, JWT, auth bypass, file upload, request smuggling, OAuth/OIDC, SAML, prototype pollution, and similar web bugs. Do not use it for native binary memory corruption, reverse engineering of standalone executables, disk or memory forensics, or pure cryptanalysis unless the web flaw is still the main path to the flag. license: MIT compatibility: Requires filesystem-based agent (Claude Code or similar) with bash, Python 3, and internet access for tool installation. allowed-tools: Bash Read Write Edit Glob Grep Task WebFetch WebSearch metadata: user-invocable: "false" --- # CTF Web Exploitation Use this skill as a routing and execution guide for web-heavy challenges. Keep the first pass short: map the app, confirm the trust boundary, and only then dive into the detailed technique notes. ## Prerequisites **Python packages (all platforms):** ```bash pip install sqlmap flask-unsign requests httpx ``` **Linux (apt):** ```bash apt install hashcat jq curl ``` **macOS (Homebrew):** ```bash brew install hashcat jq curl ``` **Go tools (all platforms, requires Go):** ```bash go install github.com/ffuf/ffuf/v2@latest ``` **Manual install:** - ysoserial — [GitHub](https://github.com/frohoff/ysoserial), requires Java (Java deserialization payloads) - PayloadsAllTheThings — git clone to ctf-web/payloads/PayloadsAllTheThings (auto via install script or lazy clone) ```bash bash scripts/install_ctf_tools.sh pat # PAT only bash scripts/install_ctf_tools.sh all # all tools including PAT # manual fallback: git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings.git ctf-web/payloads/PayloadsAllTheThings ``` > PAT is optional and on-demand — not required at load time. The skill works without it (graceful degrade): `pat-reference.md` provides an offline index with exemplar payloads; bulk wordlists require the clone above. ## Additional Resources - [sql-injection.md](sql-injection.md) - SQL injection techniques: auth bypass, UNION extraction, filter bypasses, second-order SQLi, truncation, race-assisted leaks, INSERT ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE password overwrite, innodb_table_stats WAF bypass - [server-side.md](server-side.md) - PHP type juggling, php://filter LFI, Python str.format traversal, SSTI (Jinja2, Twig, ERB, Mako, EJS, Vue.js, Smarty), SSRF (Host header, DNS rebinding, curl redirect, unescaped-dot regex, SNI FTP smuggling, mod_vhost_alias), PHP hash_hmac NULL - [server-side-2.md](server-side-2.md) - XXE (basic, OOB, DOCX upload), XML injection via X-Forwarded-For, PHP variable variables, PHP uniqid predictable filename, sequential regex replacement bypass, command injection (newline, blocklist, sendmail CGI, multi-barcode, git CLI), GraphQL injection (introspection, batching, interpolation) - [server-side-exec.md](server-side-exec.md) - Direct code execution paths, upload-to-RCE, deserialization-adjacent execution, LaTeX injection, header and API abuses - [server-side-exec-2.md](server-side-exec-2.md) - More execution chains: SQLi fragmentation, path parser tricks, polyglot uploads, wrapper abuse, filename injection, BMP pixel webshell with filename truncation - [server-side-deser.md](server-side-deser.md) - Java/Python/PHP deserialization and race-condition playbooks, PHP SoapClient CRLF SSRF via deserialization - [server-side-advanced.md](server-side-advanced.md) - Advanced SSRF, traversal, archive, parser, framework, and modern app-server issues, Nginx alias traversal - [server-side-advanced-2.md](server-side-advanced-2.md) - Docker API SSRF, Castor/XML, Apache expression reads, parser discrepancies, Windows path tricks, rogue MySQL server file read - [server-side-advanced-3.md](server-side-advanced-3.md) - Part 3 (CSAW/35C3/ASIS/PlaidCTF 2018): WAV polyglot upload, multi-slash URL `path.startswith` bypass, Xalan XSLT `math:random()` seed guess, SoapClient `_user_agent` CRLF method smuggling, `gopher:///` no-host URL scheme bypass, SSRF credential leak via attacker-specified outbound URL - [server-side-advanced-4.md](server-side-advanced-4.md) - Part 4: WeasyPrint SSRF/file read (CVE-2024-28184), MongoDB regex/$where blind oracle, Pongo2 Go template injection, ZIP PHP webshell, basename() bypass, wget CRLF SSRF→SMTP, Gopher SSRF to MySQL blind SQLi, React Server Components Flight RCE (CVE-2025-55182), AMQP/TLS interception via sslsplit+arpspoof, CairoSVG XXE, Bazaar repo reconstruction - [client-side.md](client-side.md) - XSS, CSRF, cache poisoning, DOM tricks, admin bot abuse, request smuggling, paywall bypass - [client-side-advanced.md](client-side-advanced.md) - CSP bypasses, Unicode tricks, XSSI, CSS exfiltration, browser normalization quirks, postMessage null origin bypass - [auth-and-access.md](auth-and-access.md) - Auth/authz bypasses, hidden endpoints, IDOR, redirect chains, subdomain takeover, AI chatbot jailbreaks - [auth-and-access-2.md](auth-and-access-2.md) - Part 2 (2018-era): `std::unordered_set` bucket collision auth bypass, `nodeprep.prepare` Unicode homograph username collision, SRP A=0/A=N auth bypass, ArangoDB AQL MERGE privilege escalation - [auth-jwt.md](auth-jwt.md) - JWT/JWE manipulation, weak secrets, header injection, key confusion, replay - [auth-infra.md](auth-infra.md) - OAuth/OIDC, SAML, CORS, CI/CD secrets, IdP abuse, login poisoning - [node-and-prototype.md](node-and-prototype.md) - Prototype pollution, JS sandbox escape, Node.js attack chains - [web3.md](web3.md) - Solidity and Web3 challenge notes - [cves.md](cves.md) - CVE-driven techniques you can match against challenge banners, headers, dependency leaks, or version strings - [field-notes.md](field-notes.md) - Long-form exploit notes: quick references for SQLi, XSS, LFI, JWT, SSTI, SSRF, command injection, XXE, deserialization, race conditions, auth bypass, and multi-stage chains - [python-requests.md](python-requests.md) - Python requests toolkit: session scaffold, Burp-Intruder-like fuzzer (sync + ThreadPoolExecutor + httpx async), payload deploy from pat-reference.md wordlists, header/param spray, cookie/JWT, proxy - [pat-reference.md](pat-reference.md) — PayloadsAllTheThings index: bulk payloads for XSS/SQLi/SSRF/SSTI/LFI/Command Injection/Upload (requires PAT clone, see Prerequisites) ## When to Pivot - If the target is a native binary, custom VM, or firmware image, switch to `/ctf-reverse` first. - If the HTTP bug only gives you code execution and the hard part becomes memory corruption or seccomp escape, switch to `/ctf-pwn`. - If the "web" challenge really turns on JWT math, custom MACs, or crypto primitives, switch to `/ctf-crypto`. - If the web challenge involves analyzing logs, PCAPs, or recovering artifacts from a web server, switch to `/ctf-forensics`. - If the challenge requires gathering intelligence from public web sources, DNS records, or social media before exploitation, switch to `/ctf-osint`. ## First-Pass Workflow 1. Identify the real boundary: browser only, backend only, mixed app, or auth flow. 2. Capture one normal request/response pair for every major feature before fuzzing. 3. Enumerate hidden functionality from JS bundles, response headers, routes, and alternate methods. 4. Classify the likely bug family: injection, authz, parser mismatch, upload, trust proxy, state machine, or client-side execution. 5. Build the smallest proof first: leak, bypass, or primitive. Save full exploit chaining for later. ### Bulk payloads (PayloadsAllTheThings — on-demand) This skill works without PAT at load time (graceful degrade): `pat-reference.md` and inline exemplars are available offline; bulk payloads require a PAT clone. After mapping the trust boundary (First-Pass Workflow), check [pat-reference.md](pat-reference.md) for the PAT directory that matches your bug class, then search bulk payloads: ```bash # PAT payload search (requires PAT clone — see Prerequisites; gracefully skipped if missing) ls ctf-web/payloads/PayloadsAllTheThings 2>/dev/null | head grep -R "onerror" "ctf-web/payloads/PayloadsAllTheThings/XSS Injection" 2>/dev/null | head ``` Or via agent tools (no clone required for the index itself): ``` Glob ctf-web/payloads/PayloadsAllTheThings/**/*.md Grep "union select" ctf-web/payloads/PayloadsAllTheThings ``` If `ctf-web/payloads/PayloadsAllTheThings/.git` is missing, the agent lazy-clones on demand: ```bash [ -d "ctf-web/payloads/PayloadsAllTheThings/.git" ] || git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings.git ctf-web/payloads/PayloadsAllTheThings ``` ## Quick Start Commands ```bash # Recon curl -sI https://target.com ffuf -u https://target.com/FUZZ -w wordlist.txt curl -s https://target.com/robots.txt # SQLi quick test sqlmap -u "https://target.com/page?id=1" --batch --dbs # JWT decode (no verification) echo '' | cut -d. -f2 | base64 -d 2>/dev/null | jq . # Cookie decode (Flask) flask-unsign --decode --cookie '' flask-unsign --unsign --cookie '' --wordlist rockyou.txt # SSTI probes curl "https://target.com/page?name={{7*7}}" curl "https://target.com/page?name={{config}}" # Request inspection curl -v -X POST https://target.com/api -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{}' ``` ## First Questions to Answer - Is the flag likely in the browser, an API response, a local file, a database row, or an internal service? - Does the app trust user-controlled data in templates, redirects, file paths, headers, serialized objects, or background jobs? - Are there multiple parsers disagreeing with each other: proxy vs app, URL parser vs fetcher, sanitizer vs browser, serializer vs filter? - Can you turn the bug into a smaller primitive first: read one file, forge one token, call one internal endpoint, trigger one bot visit? ## High-Value Recon Checks - Read the HTML, inline scripts, and bundled JS before guessing the API surface. - Compare what the UI submits with what the backend accepts; optional JSON fields often unlock hidden paths. - Check obvious metadata and helper paths early: `/robots.txt`, `/sitemap.xml`, `/.well-known/`, `/admin`, `/debug`, `/.git/`, `/.env`. - Try alternate verbs and content types on interesting routes: `GET`, `POST`, `PUT`, `PATCH`, `TRACE`, JSON, form, multipart, XML. - Treat file upload, PDF/export, webhook, OAuth callback, and admin bot features as likely exploit multipliers. ## Fast Pattern Map - SQL errors, odd filtering, or state-dependent DB behavior: start with [sql-injection.md](sql-injection.md). - Templating, file reads, SSRF, command execution, XML, or parser bugs: start with [server-side.md](server-side.md) and [server-side-exec.md](server-side-exec.md). - XSS, CSP bypass, admin bot, client routing, DOM issues, or scriptless exfiltration: start with [client-side.md](client-side.md). - Session forgery, hidden admin routes, JWT, OAuth, SAML, or weak trust boundaries: start with [auth-and-access.md](auth-and-access.md), [auth-jwt.md](auth-jwt.md), and [auth-infra.md](auth-infra.md). - Node.js apps, prototype pollution, VM sandboxes, or SSRF into internal services: add [node-and-prototype.md](node-and-prototype.md). - Smart contract frontends or blockchain-integrated apps: add [web3.md](web3.md). ## Common Chain Shapes - Recon -> hidden route -> auth bypass -> internal file read -> token or flag - XSS or HTML injection -> admin bot -> privileged action -> secret leak - Traversal or upload -> config/source leak -> secret recovery -> session forgery - SSRF -> metadata or internal API -> credential leak -> code execution - SQLi or NoSQL injection -> credential bypass -> second-stage template or upload abuse ## Deep-Dive Notes Use [field-notes.md](field-notes.md) once you have confirmed the challenge is truly web-heavy and you need the long exploit catalog. - Recon, SQLi, XSS, traversal, JWT, SSTI, SSRF, XXE, and command injection quick notes - Deserialization, race conditions, file upload to RCE, and multi-stage chain examples - Node, OAuth/SAML, CI/CD, Web3, bot abuse, CSP bypasses, and modern browser tricks - CVE-shaped playbooks and older challenge patterns that still show up in modern CTFs ## Common Flag Locations - Files: `/flag.txt`, `/flag`, `/app/flag.txt`, `/home/*/flag*` - Environment: `/proc/self/environ`, process command line, debug config dumps - Database: tables named `flag`, `flags`, `secret`, or seeded challenge content - HTTP: custom headers, archived responses, hidden routes, admin exports - Browser: hidden DOM nodes, `data-*` attributes, inline state objects, source maps

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