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技能库 智客分类:运维与云 analyzing-docker-container-forensics

Analyzing Docker Container Forensics

调查失败 通过分析图像,层,

608 安装量

官方网址:skills.sh

技能介绍

先看中文介绍;官方 description 原文单独保留,不改写 SKILL.md。

做什么

调查失败 通过分析图像,层,

何时用

- 在调查损坏的多克集装箱或集装箱主机时

代理如何加载

按 Agent Skills 渐进披露:启动时只加载 name 与 description(约 100 token);任务匹配后才读入整份 SKILL.md 正文;scripts/、references/、assets/ 仅在需要时再读。 本文件正文结构:Analyzing Docker Container Forensics、When to Use、Prerequisites、Workflow、Step 1: Preserve Container State and Evidence、List all containers (including stopped)。 其中含规范建议的小节:分步指令。

文件分析

文件分析:这是一份仅含 SKILL.md 的指令型技能,代理激活后整份正文进入上下文。

官方 description(原文)

Investigate compromised Docker containers by analyzing images, layers,

Analyzing Docker Container ForensicsWhen to UsePrerequisitesWorkflowStep 1: Preserve Container State and EvidenceList all containers (including stopped)Inspect the compromised containerExport container filesystem as tarball (preserves current state)Create an image from the container's current stateCapture container logsCapture running processes (if container is still running)Capture network connections

· 许可:Apache-2.0

来源分类:skills.sh agent-skill

SKILL.md 与 Agent 调用

官方规范 ↗
name
analyzing-docker-container-forensics
description
Investigate compromised Docker containers by analyzing images, layers,
许可
Apache-2.0
  1. 发现技能客户端向 Agent 提供名称与描述目录。
  2. 匹配与调用用户指定或任务匹配后,载入 SKILL.md 指令。
  3. 按需加载按步骤读取参考文档、使用脚本与素材。

具体调用语法与可用工具以目标 Agent 客户端为准。 查看调用机制说明 ↗

安装这个技能

Skills CLI ↗

先选择目标 Agent 和安装范围,保留技能包的附属文件,安装后检查客户端能否发现该技能。

交给 Agent 安装

复制安装指令给支持 Agent Skills 的代理,确认其中的目标目录与客户端匹配。

把 Agent Skill「analyzing-docker-container-forensics」安装到我的项目:SKILL.md 原文与官方 description 见 https://zicq.com/zh/skills/skl-9b9eceb28dc534a9-%E5%88%86%E6%9E%90Docker%E9%9B%86%E8%A3%85%E7%AE%B1%E6%B3%95%E8%AF%81.html
请存为 .cursor/skills/analyzing-docker-container-forensics/SKILL.md 或 .claude/skills/analyzing-docker-container-forensics/SKILL.md,frontmatter 的 name 与 description 保持原样,不要改写。

GitHub 完整包 ↗

终端安装 · Skills CLI

需要 Node.js 与 npx。先查看仓库技能列表,确认实际名称。

npx skills add 'https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills' --list

npx skills add 'https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills' --skill 'analyzing-docker-container-forensics'

CLI 会交互选择目标 Agent,默认安装到项目;用户级安装使用 -g。先通过查看命令核对仓库内容,再用 npx skills list 检查已安装技能。

阅读排版
--- name: analyzing-docker-container-forensics description: Investigate compromised Docker containers by analyzing images, layers, volumes, logs, and runtime artifacts to identify malicious activity and evidence. domain: cybersecurity subdomain: digital-forensics tags: - forensics - docker - container-forensics - container-security - image-analysis - runtime-investigation version: '1.0' author: mahipal license: Apache-2.0 nist_csf: - RS.AN-03 - DE.AE-02 - RS.MA-01 mitre_attack: - T1610 - T1611 - T1613 - T1612 --- # Analyzing Docker Container Forensics ## When to Use - When investigating a compromised Docker container or container host - For analyzing malicious Docker images pulled from registries - During incident response involving containerized application breaches - When examining container escape attempts or privilege escalation - For auditing container configurations and identifying misconfigurations ## Prerequisites - Docker CLI access on the forensic workstation - Access to the Docker host file system (forensic image or live) - Understanding of Docker layered file system (overlay2, aufs) - dive, docker-explorer, or container-diff for image analysis - Knowledge of Docker daemon configuration and socket security - Trivy or Grype for vulnerability scanning of container images ## Workflow ### Step 1: Preserve Container State and Evidence ```bash # List all containers (including stopped) docker ps -a --no-trunc > /cases/case-2024-001/docker/container_list.txt # Inspect the compromised container CONTAINER_ID="abc123def456" docker inspect $CONTAINER_ID > /cases/case-2024-001/docker/container_inspect.json # Export container filesystem as tarball (preserves current state) docker export $CONTAINER_ID > /cases/case-2024-001/docker/container_export.tar # Create an image from the container's current state docker commit $CONTAINER_ID forensic-evidence:case-2024-001 docker save forensic-evidence:case-2024-001 > /cases/case-2024-001/docker/container_image.tar # Capture container logs docker logs $CONTAINER_ID --timestamps > /cases/case-2024-001/docker/container_logs.txt 2>&1 # Capture running processes (if container is still running) docker top $CONTAINER_ID > /cases/case-2024-001/docker/container_processes.txt # Capture network connections docker exec $CONTAINER_ID netstat -tlnp 2>/dev/null > /cases/case-2024-001/docker/container_network.txt # Copy specific files from the container docker cp $CONTAINER_ID:/var/log/ /cases/case-2024-001/docker/container_var_log/ docker cp $CONTAINER_ID:/tmp/ /cases/case-2024-001/docker/container_tmp/ docker cp $CONTAINER_ID:/etc/passwd /cases/case-2024-001/docker/container_passwd # Hash all exported evidence sha256sum /cases/case-2024-001/docker/*.tar > /cases/case-2024-001/docker/evidence_hashes.txt ``` ### Step 2: Analyze Container Image Layers ```bash # Install dive for image layer analysis wget https://github.com/wagoodman/dive/releases/latest/download/dive_linux_amd64.deb sudo dpkg -i dive_linux_amd64.deb # Analyze image layers interactively dive forensic-evidence:case-2024-001 # Non-interactive layer analysis dive forensic-evidence:case-2024-001 --ci --json /cases/case-2024-001/docker/dive_analysis.json # Extract and examine individual layers mkdir -p /cases/case-2024-001/docker/layers/ tar -xf /cases/case-2024-001/docker/container_image.tar -C /cases/case-2024-001/docker/layers/ # List the image manifest and layer order cat /cases/case-2024-001/docker/layers/manifest.json | python3 -m json.tool # Examine each layer for changes for layer in /cases/case-2024-001/docker/layers/*/layer.tar; do echo "=== Layer: $(dirname $layer | xargs basename) ===" tar -tf "$layer" | head -20 echo "..." done # Use container-diff to compare with original base image # Install container-diff curl -LO https://storage.googleapis.com/container-diff/latest/container-diff-linux-amd64 chmod +x container-diff-linux-amd64 # Compare committed image with original ./container-diff-linux-amd64 diff daemon://nginx:latest daemon://forensic-evidence:case-2024-001 \ --type=file --type=apt --type=history --json \ > /cases/case-2024-001/docker/container_diff.json ``` ### Step 3: Examine Docker Host Artifacts ```bash # Docker data directory (default: /var/lib/docker/) DOCKER_ROOT="/mnt/evidence/var/lib/docker" # Examine overlay2 filesystem layers ls -la $DOCKER_ROOT/overlay2/ # Find the container's merged filesystem CONTAINER_HASH=$(docker inspect $CONTAINER_ID --format '{{.GraphDriver.Data.MergedDir}}' 2>/dev/null) # Or manually from forensic image: # Look in /var/lib/docker/containers//config.v2.json # Analyze container configuration files cat $DOCKER_ROOT/containers/$CONTAINER_ID/config.v2.json | python3 -m json.tool \ > /cases/case-2024-001/docker/container_config.json # Check Docker daemon configuration cat /mnt/evidence/etc/docker/daemon.json 2>/dev/null > /cases/case-2024-001/docker/daemon_config.json # Examine Docker events log cat $DOCKER_ROOT/containers/$CONTAINER_ID/*.log > /cases/case-2024-001/docker/container_json_logs.txt # Check for volume mounts (potential host filesystem access) python3 << 'PYEOF' import json with open('/cases/case-2024-001/docker/container_inspect.json') as f: data = json.load(f) inspect = data[0] if isinstance(data, list) else data print("=== CONTAINER SECURITY ANALYSIS ===\n") # Check mounts print("Volume Mounts:") for mount in inspect.get('Mounts', []): rw = "READ-WRITE" if mount.get('RW') else "READ-ONLY" print(f" {mount.get('Source', 'N/A')} -> {mount.get('Destination', 'N/A')} ({rw})") if mount.get('Source') in ('/', '/etc', '/var', '/root') and mount.get('RW'): print(f" WARNING: Sensitive host path mounted read-write!") # Check privileged mode host_config = inspect.get('HostConfig', {}) if host_config.get('Privileged'): print("\nWARNING: Container was running in PRIVILEGED mode!") # Check capabilities cap_add = host_config.get('CapAdd', []) if cap_add: print(f"\nAdded Capabilities: {cap_add}") dangerous_caps = ['SYS_ADMIN', 'SYS_PTRACE', 'NET_ADMIN', 'SYS_MODULE'] for cap in cap_add: if cap in dangerous_caps: print(f" WARNING: Dangerous capability: {cap}") # Check PID namespace if host_config.get('PidMode') == 'host': print("\nWARNING: Container shares host PID namespace!") # Check network mode if host_config.get('NetworkMode') == 'host': print("\nWARNING: Container shares host network namespace!") # Check user user = inspect.get('Config', {}).get('User', 'root (default)') print(f"\nRunning as user: {user}") # Check environment variables for secrets env_vars = inspect.get('Config', {}).get('Env', []) print(f"\nEnvironment Variables: {len(env_vars)}") for env in env_vars: key = env.split('=')[0] if any(s in key.upper() for s in ['PASSWORD', 'SECRET', 'KEY', 'TOKEN', 'CREDENTIAL']): print(f" SENSITIVE: {key}=***REDACTED***") PYEOF ``` ### Step 4: Analyze Container File System Changes ```bash # Compare container filesystem to original image docker diff $CONTAINER_ID > /cases/case-2024-001/docker/filesystem_changes.txt # A = Added, C = Changed, D = Deleted # Analyze changes python3 << 'PYEOF' added = [] changed = [] deleted = [] with open('/cases/case-2024-001/docker/filesystem_changes.txt') as f: for line in f: line = line.strip() if line.startswith('A '): added.append(line[2:]) elif line.startswith('C '): changed.append(line[2:]) elif line.startswith('D '): deleted.append(line[2:]) print(f"Files Added: {len(added)}") print(f"Files Changed: {len(changed)}") print(f"Files Deleted: {len(deleted)}") # Flag suspicious additions suspicious = [f for f in added if any(s in f for s in ['/tmp/', '/dev/shm/', '/root/', '.sh', '.py', '.elf', 'reverse', 'shell', 'backdoor'])] if suspicious: print(f"\nSuspicious Added Files:") for f in suspicious: print(f" {f}") # Flag suspicious changes sus_changed = [f for f in changed if any(s in f for s in ['/etc/passwd', '/etc/shadow', '/etc/crontab', '/etc/ssh', '.bashrc'])] if sus_changed: print(f"\nSuspicious Changed Files:") for f in sus_changed: print(f" {f}") PYEOF # Extract and examine the container export mkdir -p /cases/case-2024-001/docker/container_fs/ tar -xf /cases/case-2024-001/docker/container_export.tar -C /cases/case-2024-001/docker/container_fs/ # Scan for webshells and malicious files find /cases/case-2024-001/docker/container_fs/tmp/ -type f -exec file {} \; find /cases/case-2024-001/docker/container_fs/ -name "*.php" -newer /cases/case-2024-001/docker/container_fs/etc/hostname ``` ### Step 5: Scan for Vulnerabilities and Generate Report ```bash # Scan the image for known vulnerabilities trivy image forensic-evidence:case-2024-001 \ --format json \ --output /cases/case-2024-001/docker/vulnerability_scan.json # Scan the exported filesystem trivy fs /cases/case-2024-001/docker/container_fs/ \ --format table \ --output /cases/case-2024-001/docker/fs_vulnerabilities.txt # Check for secrets in the image trivy image forensic-evidence:case-2024-001 \ --scanners secret \ --format json \ --output /cases/case-2024-001/docker/secrets_scan.json ``` ## Key Concepts | Concept | Description | |---------|-------------| | Image layers | Read-only filesystem layers stacked to form the container image | | overlay2 | Default Docker storage driver using union filesystem for layers | | Container diff | Comparison of runtime filesystem changes against the original image | | Privileged mode | Container with full host capabilities (bypasses most isolation) | | Docker socket | Unix socket (/var/run/docker.sock) controlling the Docker daemon | | Container escape | Technique for breaking out of container isolation to the host | | Volume mounts | Host filesystem paths made accessible inside the container | | Image history | Record of Dockerfile instructions used to build each layer | ## Tools & Systems | Tool | Purpose | |------|---------| | docker inspect | Detailed container configuration and state information | | docker diff | Show filesystem changes made in a running/stopped container | | dive | Interactive Docker image layer analysis tool | | container-diff | Google tool for comparing container image contents | | Trivy | Vulnerability scanner for container images and filesystems | | docker-explorer | Forensic tool for offline Docker artifact analysis | | Sysdig | Container runtime security monitoring and forensics | | Falco | Runtime threat detection for containers and Kubernetes | ## Common Scenarios **Scenario 1: Web Application Container Compromise** Export the container filesystem, identify webshells in web root, analyze access logs for exploitation attempts, check for added files and modified configurations, examine network connections for C2 communication, review container capabilities for escalation paths. **Scenario 2: Supply Chain Attack via Malicious Image** Analyze image layers with dive to identify which layer added malicious content, compare with the official base image using container-diff, check image history for suspicious RUN commands, scan for embedded backdoors and cryptocurrency miners, trace the image pull from registry logs. **Scenario 3: Container Escape Investigation** Check if container ran privileged or with dangerous capabilities, examine host filesystem mount points for unauthorized access, review Docker socket mount enabling Docker-in-Docker abuse, analyze host system logs for container escape indicators, check for kernel exploit artifacts. **Scenario 4: Cryptojacking in Container Environment** Identify high-CPU containers, export and analyze the container image for mining binaries, check for unauthorized images in the registry, review container creation events for rogue deployments, examine network connections for mining pool communications. ## Output Format ``` Docker Container Forensics Summary: Container: abc123def456 (nginx-app) Image: company/web-app:v2.1 Status: Running (started 2024-01-10 09:00 UTC) Host: docker-host-01.corp.local Security Configuration: Privileged: No Capabilities Added: NET_ADMIN (WARNING) Volume Mounts: /var/log -> /host-logs (RW) Network Mode: bridge User: root (WARNING) Filesystem Changes: Added: 23 files (5 suspicious) Changed: 12 files (2 suspicious) Deleted: 0 files Suspicious Findings: /tmp/reverse.sh - Reverse shell script (Added) /var/www/html/.hidden/shell.php - PHP webshell (Added) /etc/crontab - Modified (persistence cron entry added) /root/.ssh/authorized_keys - Modified (unauthorized key added) Vulnerability Scan: Critical: 3 (CVE-2024-xxxx in base image) High: 12 Medium: 34 Evidence: /cases/case-2024-001/docker/ ```

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